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Abstract
Antitrust investigations typically focus on the competitive pressures coming
from within the dened markets of interest. However, competitive pressures can
also come from other markets. Even when individually these markets place only
weak constraints on one another, collectively they may matter. A networks ap-
proach to modelling competition permits a systemic view of competition that can
sometimes paint a more accurate picture. We demonstrate this through some sim-
ple examples, and show more generally how tools from the networks literature can
be applied to capture competition across a system of interrelated markets. As a
leading example, we consider antitrust investigations into supermarkets where local
geographic markets have been used as the basis of investigation.
1 Introduction
Despite a surge of research over the last decade or so related to networks and markets, the
ideas from this research programme have not yet inuenced antitrust investigations in a
meaningful way. In this article we investigate the possible reasons why not, and consider
whether the academic literature on networks has practical insights, methodologies and
approaches that could be incorporated into antitrust investigations to help them better
serve the interests of consumers.
We will argue that antitrust investigations could benet from a more holistic view the lens
of network theory can provide, but also that there are substantial impediments to this
∗We thank Simon Cowan for very helpful comments. Financial support from the European Research
Council under the grants EMBED #757229 (Elliott) and #283454 (Galeotti) is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
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being achieved. The substantial impediment is not datathe required data is already
largely used to dene markets, it is more fundamental than that. Getting the benets a
networks approach can provide requires rethinking the basic framework in which antitrust
investigations take place.
A central tenet of both merger and abuse of a dominant position investigations is market
denition. We argue that this largely excludes the competitive forces that a systemic
network based approach could internalise. Considering, rather than abstracting from,
the cycles and chains of interactions between market participants can be important for
anticipating the eects of various antitrust interventions on consumer surplus. The net-
works literature provides the tools to undertake such a systemic approach and, as already
mentioned, often this approach will only require data that is already collected to dene
markets.
We limit the scope of the article to investigating how a systemic approach might aid
antitrust investigations, and focus only on the UK antitrust authorities and UK antitrust
cases. Our analysis is mainly conned to some revealing examples that we would like to
be taken as a proof of concept. While our focus is on horizontal merger analysis, we note
that the points we make apply also to other issues including, but not limited to: vertical
merger analysis, exclusive dealing contracts and price discrimination.
The structure of the article is as follows. First we briey review the related networks
literature in Section 2. In Section 3 we review some key components of anti-trust in-
vestigations and pose the question of why the related networks literature has had little
impact to date. To provide more context, in Section 4, we discuss the 2008 Competition
Commission Supermarkets Inquiry. This leads us to develop a simple theoretical model
capable of capturing competition between markets, as dened within the Competition
Commission Inquiry, as well as within markets. In this section we present our main re-
sults. Section 6 investigates the robustness of our ndings to the way in which we model
competition. Section 7 concludes.
2 Brief overview of the academic literature on net-
works and markets
Traditionally, economics sees markets as populated by agents interacting anonymously
through the price system. The classical paradigm of general equilibrium presumes large
economies in which goods are homogeneous, perfectly divisible, information is complete
and market participants take prices as given. Under this paradigm, the law of one price
emerges, and, through the market system, resources are allocated eciently.
But these premises are in contrast with a body of evidence accumulated over time that
shows that individual relationships and bonds of trust aect economic outcomes in many
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relevant cases. The importance of business relationships in markets nd a strong foun-
dation in the sociological literature, see for example Granovetter (1973) and Granovetter
(1985). As specic supplier-to-supplier, supplier-to-manufacturer and manufacturer-to-
consumer relationships are formed, market participants develop competitive advantages
from doing business with specic others. Relevant information is held within a specic
relationship, rms dierentiate and position themselves in niche markets, and, often,
market power and chains of intermediation emerge.
Economists have deepened their understanding of markets by relaxing the assumed ab-
sence of market power, leading to the development of a comprehensive theory of oligopoly
markets (see Tirole (1988)), a major tool used by competition authorities.1 But a sys-
tematic study of how connections across market participants aect market outcomes, and
how this could inform authorities in their methodology to investigate and intervene in
markets, has only started to be developed in the last two decades or so; see part VII of
Bramoulle et al. (2016) for a survey and perspective of this literature. We can divide
the study of markets using networks in two related categories: the study of buyer-seller
networks and the study of intermediation in networks.2
Buyer and seller networks. Manufacturer-supplier relationships take dierent forms
depending on the specic industry. At one extreme, in industries where inputs and -
nal products are standardized these relationships tend to be determined by anonymous
markets. At the other extreme, when a manufacturer needs very specic inputs from
the supplier there is a pressure towards vertically integrated manufacturer-supplier rela-
tionships. In the middle, we have networks: manufactures tend to form closed relation-
ships with a small subset of suppliers. These suppliers acquire rst specic information
and rm specic know-how to supply made-to-measure inputs to the manufacture. Yet,
manufacturer-supplier relationships are not exclusive and this generates ineciencies,
for example, in investments. The level of these ineciencies is aected by the compe-
tition faced by manufactures and the structure of the network between suppliers and
manufactures.
Kranton and Minehart (2000) and Kranton and Minehart (2001) are probably the rst
to formalize an economic model of buyer-seller networks and study the implications of
these networks for economic performance. In turn, this has led to an active research
agenda on buyer-seller networks, see Corominas-Bosch (2004), Elliott (2015), Elliott and
Nava (2019), Manea (2011), Polanski (2007) and Talamas (2016). Recently, buyer-seller
networks model have also been adopted and extended to study the impact of exclusive
1There is also an important body of theoretical work that provides foundations based on game theory
for the law of one price, see Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990), Gale
(1986a) Gale (1986b), Gale (1987).
2There is also a body of work that incorporates networks into matching models of markets. The focus
of this literature is to derive conditions under which competitive outcomes can be achieved despite trade
being decentralised, and possibly organized through trading networks, e.g., Ostrovsky (2008), Hateld
et al. (2013) and Fleiner et al. (2019).
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contracts in markets, see Ramezzana (2019). For a survey on buyer-seller networks see
Manea (2016).
Intermediation and Resale. In a wide range of markets trade involves a long list of
middlemen, connecting producers to buyers. Production and distribution create supply
chains, a major example of chains of intermediation. Chains of intermediation are typical
in the market for agricultural goods, as well as in nancial markets for the trade of assets
sold over-the-counter. Resale of event tickets, art and collectables are another example of
intermediated markets often discussed by policy makers. As products ow downstream
along the chain of intermediaries, the terms of trade agreed in each step depend both on
horizontal competition among the middlemen as well as on vertical complementarities
often present between intermediaries operating at dierent phases of the chain. The
implication of, say, a merger between two intermediaries on the market outcome depends
on how it aects horizontal competition viz. the vertical complementarities.
These ideas have recently been formalized in the following articles. Manea (2018) and
Condorelli et al. (2017) study bargaining models of resale in networks. Choi et al. (2017),
Gale and Kariv (2009) and Blume et al. (2009) study posted price in networks, Nava
(2015) studies quantity competition in networks. Bimpikis et al. (2019) study multi-
market Cournot competition in a networked market. Malamud and Rostek (2017) and
Babus and Condor (2018) study asset trading in networks. For a survey on intermediation
and resale in networks see Condorelli and Galeotti (2016).
At a general level, both in the case of buyer-seller networks and in the case of inter-
mediation networks, the structure of the network matters because it determines outside
options and opportunity costs of each relationship. Hence, the eect of a change on a
particular connection will not be conned to that relationship. It will spread to close-by
connections, and from there to the entire network. To x ideas:
• In a buyer-seller network, as supplier A develops a new connection with manufac-
turer B, the terms of trade of supplier A with her other connections, say manufac-
turer C changes. In turn, this aects the competitiveness of manufacturer C and B
with the manufacturers in the markets that use other suppliers, and these eects
will keep spreading in the network. The understanding of the eect for consumer
surplus of a vertical merger or a new exclusive contract between a supplier and a
manufacturer needs to take into account these feedback eects.
• In networks of intermediaries, a horizontal merger between two middlemen aects
the terms of trade between those intermediaries and their upstream trading partners
and their downstream partners. In turn, these eects will propagate upstream up
to initial producers and downstream to nal customers.
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3 Antitrust Investigations
Despite the very active academic research in the last two decades, we are not aware of
investigations by competition authorities that takes into account these possibly intricate
network feedbacks. There are several possible explanations. First, a network approach
might require data that is not typically available. The network approach is systemic. All
interconnections are considered at once, and it might be expected that the data required
for this, rather than breaking the system it into parts, would be prohibitively dicult to
collect and analyse. Second, it might be expected that, in practice, the network eects
are relatively small, and can be safely ignored. Considering within market competitive
constraints might provide a good approximation of overall competition. As long as the
market is well dened, the eective competitive pressure could come from within the
market. Evaluating these possibilities requires understanding how antitrust investigations
are conducted.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is largely responsible for the enforce-
ment of antitrust policy in the UK, having taken over from the Oce of Fair Trading
(OFT) and Competition Commission following the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
Act 2013. The rst step the CMA take, as was the case with the OFT and Competition
Commission before them, is to dene the markets that may be aected. This is true for
both a merger or anticompetitive behaviour investigation. Although the focus of this
article is on UK antitrust policy, it is worth noting that similar approaches are taken by
the European Commission (under Articles 101-109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union), and in US investigations (under the Sherman Act, Clayton Act and
Federal Trade Commission Act, among others). Only after markets have been dened
are anti-competitive eects considered, and this is done through the lens of the dened
markets.
Markets are dened using a hypothetical monopolist test: If the market was monopolised,
could the monopoly aect a small but signicant non-transitory increase in price? This
is referred to as the SSNIP test and in practice is taken to mean about a 5% increase in
prices. So, the SSNIP test is used to identify the smallest relevant market within which
a hypothetical monopolist will impose a large enough increase in price. In practice, the
SSNIP test checks whether an increase in price in the range of 5% of a basket of goods
and services (what has been dened the market of reference) would lead consumers to
still buy those goods (in which case the SSNIP test is passed), or would induce consumer
to switch to substitute products (in which case the denition of market of reference will
be expanded). In eect the SSNIP test calculates the residual elasticity of demand of the
proposed basket of goods, and expands the basket until demand is suciently inelastic.
The data required for this exercise is not trivial. Indeed, it is closely related to the
data requirements of a systemic, network-based approach. In order to exclude a good
from a market it must be shown that it exerts a suciently weak competitive impact
on the market. Once the competitive impact is being estimated for this purpose, the
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very same estimation can be used to carry out the systemic analysis that we propose. In
the main, the data required for a network approach to be taken is already collected in
order to dene markets. Often data requirements should not be a major impediment to
a network approach being used.
Market denition is an important part of antitrust investigations. The submissions of
the interested parties and the nal reports published by the antitrust authorities often
devote considerable space to the issue of market denition. It can be the main focus
of investigations. Dening markets rst helps limit the scope of antitrust investigations
and simplify them. It may thus create a more certain business environment and help
to dissuade some anti-competitive behaviour by allowing rms to better anticipate the
outcome of potential investigations.
However, this framework, by largely abstracting from the indirect eects between the de-
ned markets, may also inhibit the ability of regulatory authorities from making decisions
that achieve their legislative goal of maximizing consumer surplus or other objectives.
The SSNIP test necessarily excludes non-local eects. It misses the cumulative impact
of many individually weak interactions between rms that are considered to operate in
dierent markets. A theme from the networked markets literature is that these small
local eects can interact in ways that are collectively signicant across markets. Further,
these interactions can spread anticompetitive eects, as well as constrain them. The
way in which the markets are dened necessarily abstracts from these interactions even
though their inclusion could aect the qualitative and quantitative conclusions reached
by an investigation.
It is precisely the ability to account for all the indirect competitive eects in a complex
setting that the networked markets literature brings to the table. This is what it adds
on top of simple examples of related phenomena, such as hold-up, the impact of outside
options on bargaining and so on, that are already well known in the IO literature. As
the standard approach taken in antitrust investigations is predisposed to ignore these
indirect eects, it is perhaps unsurprising that the networked markets literature has had
relatively little impact in antitrust investigations to date.3
As there is a trade-o involved in taking a more systemic approach to competitive forces
despite the potential to reach better decisions, it also makes the analysis more complicated
and potentially less transparentit is important to know whether a systemic approach
might bring substantial benets or whether the standard approach does a good job ap-
proximating competitive forces. Can the weak competitive eects captured by taking a
systemic approach to antitrust investigations be safely excluded?
3In terms of comparison, we note that authorities regulating nancial systems use systemic analysis
to shape their policies and regulations. The idea of systemic eects (often referred to as systemic risk)
has been central to the policy debate in nance since the nancial crisis, and subsequent regulations and
market interventions have explicitly tried to address these concerns (see [[other OXREP article in this
issue on nancial networks]]).
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4 Competition Commission Supermarkets Inquiry 2008
To evaluate the potential impact of taking a more systemic approach to antitrust it is
helpful to consider specic cases rather than argue in the abstract. Here we focus on the
Competition Commission's Supermarkets Inquiry of 2008. Given the recently concluded
and somewhat controversial investigation that blocked the merger between Asda and
Sainsbury's, a reexamination of this inquiry is timely. The foundations and framework
for the Asda and Sainsbury investigation was laid down in this market inquiry. We also fo-
cus on this inquiry because market denition was crucial as well as contentious (although
as claimed above this is not uncommon), and because the analysis of supermarkets has
received considerable attention and benetted from related academic work. Important
and inuential academic work has helped to identify competitive forces within markets
(see, for example, Smith (2004)) and led to sophisticated econometrics being used in the
Competition Commission inquiry, albeit within the context of the current framework.
Further, this investigation built on previous related investigations within the same sec-
tor (e.g., investigations into the Cooperative Group's acquisition of Somereld, and the
acquisition of Safeway by Morrisons) and so represents a mature understanding of these
markets that has attracted substantial resources and, in our view, been done to a high
standard. It provides a high-water mark to improve upon.4
In the 2008 Competition Commission inquiry into UK supermarkets the Competition
Commission considered dening markets along various dimensions, including store size,
product oering and geography. We pay particular attention here to the geographi-
cal dimension, but as we will argue later, considering the other dimensions only adds
weight to our conclusions. To inform their choice of how to dene markets geographi-
cally the Competition Commission undertook an empirical analysis of prot margins by
local competition. They found that on average as the number of competing facias (rms,
as opposed to stores which may be run by the same rm) within 10 minutes drive-time of
a store increased, that store's prot margin decreased (paragraph 4.110, Appendix 4.4).
A related nding was that the inuence of competitor stores declined with drive-time
(4.112, Appendix 4.4). Based on this, a qualitative analysis and the submissions of dif-
ferent interest groups and their comments to the Competition Commissions own analysis,
the Competition Commission based the geographic dimension of their market denition
on a 10 minute drive-time (and supported their results with several robustness checks).
Once markets are dened locally, competitive pressures from outside the market, and the
impacts of increasing prot margins in one market, by raising price or reducing quality, to
other markets are not considered. Through feedback loops that are naturally present, we
contend that these eects might be substantial. The anti-competitive eects of increasing
4At the time we were revising this article the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has ruled
to block the merger between Asda and Sainsbury (25 April 2019). The CMA report indicates that the
methodology used to dene the market of reference is based on similar considerations to those that were
used in the 2008 inquiry.
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price or reducing quality can lead others outside the market to make similar choices, that
can lead others to make similar choices, and so on, feeding back into the market of
reference. These systemic network eects can lead not only to an underestimation of
the harm a price increase in a local market can have on consumer surplus overall, but
also on consumer surplus within the market that the authority had dened. Moreover,
when several such markets are aected at once, for example through a merger of facias
(rms), the cumulative impact of these eects can have a substantial global impact on
the market that cannot be fully appreciated in a market-by-market analysis.
The market denition framework may have impeded the Competition Commission in the
supermarket inquiry from considering such eects. Aected markets had to be dened
and a national market denition would have ignored local market heterogeneities that
are important, whereas limiting the geographic scope of the market ignores the feedback
eects discussed above.
5 Analysis
The Competition Commission inquiry used relatively sophisticated econometric tech-
niques to estimate competitive eects within local markets and to address potential
identication problems. And given the market denitions framework it operated within,
it seems to have done a good job. However, this framework leads to a focus on local
rather than global eects. We introduce a simple and intentionally supercial model of
supermarket competition to illustrate how a network approach might be important for
determining the impact of a merger. This is intended as a proof of concept, in contrast
to the sophisticated econometric model of supermarket competition developed by Smith
(2004).
5.1 A model of supermarket competition
There are k markets, and in each market there are n independently operated supermar-
kets. Each supermarket i has a mass αi of locked/loyal customers. This provides a way of
incorporating switching costs into the model, see Klemperer (1987). Supermarkets also
compete for customers that are price sensitive. This is formalised using the Hotelling
model to model dierentiation in a network context as we explain now.
There are two types of links: strong and weak links. Strong links connect supermarkets
operating in the same market. We model markets as cliques: supermarkets within a
market are fully connected. In each strong link there is a mass 1 of consumers distributed
uniformly on the unit interval. Weak links connect rms across markets. If market ` and
`′ are connected, this means that there are weak links between every pair of supermarket
i in market ` and supermarket j in market `′. In each weak link there is a mass w < 1
of consumers, also distributed uniformly on the unit interval.
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Consumers have unit demand, valuation v and face a linear transportation cost t mean-
ing that they prefer to purchase from supermarkets they are located closer to. Those
consumers located in the edge connecting supermarket i and j choose to buy either from
i or j given the prices pi and pj, their location on the unit interval between these rms
and the transportation cost. Firms produce at a constant marginal cost.
(a) Circle Market Connections (b) Torus Market Connections
(c) Within Market Connections (d) Across Market Connections
Figure 1: Panels (a) and (b) illustrate connections between markets. Each node rep-
resents a market and a link in these panels represents that every pair of rms in these
dierent but connected markets, compete for a small mass of customers located on a
Hotelling line between them. Panel (c) illustrates competition within a market. Nodes
are rms in the same market and links are strongthere is a unit mass of customers
located on a Hotelling line between the two rms which they compete for. Panel (d)
shows in more detail the structure of weak links between rms in adjacent markets. Each
node is a rm and the links are weak.
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Figure 1 illustrates competition both within and across markets. Two structures are
considered for the links between markets. A circle network (a one-dimensional torus
illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1), and a torus network (a two-dimensional torus illus-
trated in Panel B of Figure 1). In both examples, each market contains four supermarkets
(see Panel C of Figure 1).
For each of the networks we perform the following exercise. First, we derive the equilib-
rium prices across all markets at once, allowing these prices to be set optimally. We con-
trast this with the equilibrium prices obtained under the assumption that prices outside
the market are xed. In this latter case, the strategic responses of rms ignore out-of-
market competition. In both cases, we then simulate a merger of faciasthe merger of
two supermarket chains that each operate one store in each marketand compare the
two predictions.
We consider two cases.
A. We rst suppose that two stores competing across markets compete for 1/10th the
mass of customers that two stores competing within a market compete for, i.e.,
w = 0.1.
B. We then suppose that two stores competing across markets compete for 1/5th the
mass of customers, i.e., w = 0.2.
We remark that, in both cases, our choice of w is suciently small for each market we
dene to pass the SSNIP testA hypothetical monopoly of one of our markets would
be able to raise prices by more than 5%.5 Moreover, the selected values of w are in line
with the estimates produced by the Competition Commission report. In comparison,
considering Figure 4.9 from the Competition Commission report, the revenue impact of
a medium or large sized store located within 5 minutes drive time has 3-4 times the
impact on revenues of a store located 10-15 minutes drive time away (which is on the
boundary of being excluded from the market).
We nd that ignoring the out-of-market competition leads pre-merger prices to be esti-
mated correctly. However, when we consider a merger of facias and study the resulting
price increases we conclude that ignoring the out-of-market competition leads the price
increases to be underestimated. The magnitude of the underestimation is substantial
despite a given across-market link being weak.
5.2 Short discussion of modelling choice
Given the market structures described, rms simultaneously choose what prices to set.
An alternative approach would be to let rms choose how much to produce in each market
5We do not report the calculation here, but they are available upon request to the authors.
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and model Cournot competition. We consider this alternative in Section 6, and show our
qualitative results are robust to the change.6
We assume price discrimination is not possible. As customers come to supermarkets
they face the same prices and so the supermarket is unable to set dierent prices to
dierent customers. Thus each store chooses a single price. Although we have in mind
that the same facias own stores in the various markets, we assume prices are set locally
to maximize store prots.
In representations to the Competition Commission it was argued by supermarket chains
that prices are set at a national rather than local level.7 However, the Competition
Commission concluded that competition was local. For example, part of their reasoning
involved estimating the impact of a new store entering the market on a similarly sized
store. They found the impact of the entering rm on the incumbent's revenues dropped
o with distance and was fairly small for journey times of more than 10-15 minutes
(See Figure 4.9 of the Competition Commission report). For robustness, two geographic
market denitions were used in this analysis. The rst included only stores within 10
minutes drive time, the second included only stores within 15 minutes drive time. They
also argued that in practice competition is multi-dimensional and occurs in terms of the
quality of the shopping experience as well as pricing. Multidimensional competition is
beyond the scope of our simple model. We take competition in prices as a proxy for more
general competition.
An implication of permitting prices to be set locally is that stores operated by the same
facia compete with each other, albeit to a limited extend because by our construction they
are located in adjacent markets. A quarter of a rm's across market links are to stores
operated by the same facia. It may be realistic to think about local managers optimizing
the performance of their store without internalizing the impact on other stores under
the same ownership. We also do not think our results would change substantially if we
modeled prices as being set at the facia level.
5.3 Equilibrium analysis
To ease exposition, in what follows we set the mass of loyal consumers and the marginal
cost of each rm to 0. The appendix provides the general derivation. Consider a link
between supermarket i and supermarket j; without loss of generality, we suppose i is
6A possible advantage of working with dierentiated price competition is that in a standard Cournot
model with identical rms, a merger between two rms in a market of size n > 2 is unprotable (Salant
et al., 1983). This and related results are known as the Cournot paradox. Of course, if there are
synergies, then such mergers can be protable. Indeed, a literature evolving from Farrell and Shapiro
(1990) takes a Cournot approach to merger analysis by using the implied protability of mergers that
are proposed. This provides a lower bound on the size of synergies that is incorporated into the analysis.
7When making this argument the chains were claiming that a single geographic market should be
dened rather than many local markets.
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located at 0 and j is located at 1. For a given pi and pj, the indierent consumer is local
at l such that:
l =
t+ pj − pi
2t
.
Under the assumption that customers are uniformly located over the unit interval and








Denote the network describing connections across supermarkets in the same market as
gLM with gLMij = 1 if i and j are in the same market g
LM
ij = 0 otherwise. The network
describing connections between supermarkets in dierent markets is denoted by gAM :
gAMij = w if, and only if, i and j are in connected markets. The network g = g
LM + gAM









Thus, the problem of a manager operating supermarket i is
max
pi≥0
Πi(p) = (pi − ci)Di(p).
The equilibrium price prole p∗ will then solve, for all i,
Di(p





Dene ĝLM and ĝAM such that ĝLMij = g
LM




ij /di; furthermore, let










Thus, letting I be the identify matrix, in matrix notation the conditions for equilibrium
















8As a convention we set gii = 0 for all i.




is invertible; a sucient condition is that 1/2 times
the largest (in absolute value) eigenvalue of ĝLM + ĝAM is less than 1; this holds when w is suciently
small.
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This formula is familiar from many other contexts in the networks literature, including
the analysis of network games (e.g. Ballester et al. (2006), Bramoulle et al. (2014),
Galeotti et al. (2017)), nancial networks literature (e.g., Elliott et al. (2014), Acemoglu
et al. (2015) and Cabrales et al. (2017)), the analysis of the input-output structure of
economies (e.g., Leontief (1936), Acemoglu et al. (2012)) and the analysis of power and
centrality in networks in the quantitative social network literature (e.g., Bonacich (1987)


















This captures the innite sum of indirect eects that occur in equilibrium. The price
that a supermarket in market k ends up charging does not depend only on the other
three supermarkets in the same market; that is, does not depend only on ĝLM . But it
also depends on the supermarkets that operate in the other marketsthe network ĝAM .
Each of these indirect eects is small by construction (as we think of w being small).
But, in combination these indirect eects can be important. How important they are will
depend on how many cycles there are in the network and the strength of these cycles.






sums up the paths from supermarket i to supermarket j, where each of these paths is
weighted depending on the strength of each link composing the path and a decay factor









measures how much supermarket i is globally connected to each of the other supermar-
kets, not just directly. Maybe supermarket i has only a weak link with supermarket j as
they operate in dierent markets; but the way they are globally connected to each other
depends on the possibly intricate structure of the networks. And, in our example, an
important determinant of this will be how many markets there are that are interacting
with one another. The locally dened markets for the supermarkets inquiry is an instance
in which there are many such markets that may be interacting with one another.
5.4 Equilibrium analysis without out-of-market connections
As a comparison suppose we turn o the strategic interaction across markets. Since
markets are symmetric, we focus on the price charged by rms in one of the markets.
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We assume that these rms choose their price optimally, taking the prices charged by
the rms outside their market as xed. Without loss of generality, we x the price of













Notice that there are now just n unknown prices: the price of each rm in the market







ij p̄ and let g̃
LM denote the n-by-n adjacency matrix of the local network









5.5 Illustration of mergers: numerical example
In this section we compare equilibrium prices obtained by ignoring out-of-market inter-
actions (p̃∗ given by 3) to equilibrium prices obtained taking into account the feedback
eects (p∗ given by 1). We compare these prices both prior to and after a merger between
facias that operate one store in each market. We denote the post-merger prices by p̃∗post
and p∗post respectively. For these numerical examples we set t = 1 and consider k = 16
markets each containing n = 4 stores.
We start by considering the case in which the markets are connected in a circle as shown
in Panel A of Figure 1. Using expression (1) for equilibrium prices we nd that all rms
charge a price of p∗ = 1. If we had ignored out-of-market eects by considering the
pricing problem in one market while xing the prices set in other markets to p̄ = 1, we
nd that local prices are still p̃∗ = 1. This makes sense. When the rms outside of the
market choose to set a price of 1, rms within the market best respond to these prices
and each other by also setting a price of 1. If the prices outside the market are instead
xed at 1, then the rms in the market face the same trade-o and therefore their best
responses do not change.
Consider now a merger between two facias each operating a store in one market. If
supermarket i and supermarket j merge to form supermarket m then the weight of the
merged supermarket m to a store k is gmk = gik + gjk for all k 6= i, j. We assume the
mass of consumers that i and j previously competed over, a mass of 1 given that i and
j are in the same market, now become captive.10 The link structure within markets and
across markets post-merger is shown in Figure 2.
10Appendix 5.3 shows how this is incorporated into our calculations. In the context of these calcula-
tions, we still have gmm = 0, but αm = αi + αj + 1. As we have set αi = 0 for all i so far, this implies
that αm = 1.
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(a) Within Market Connections (b) Across Market Connections
Figure 2: Panels (a) and (b) show the post-merger links between rms. Within each
panel, the relative size of the nodes and links represent the size of the rms and strength
of connections respectively. Panel (a) illustrates the within market links and panel (b)
the across market links. The connections between markets is as shown in Panels (a) and
(b) of Figure 1.
The price set by the stores that have merged increases by ∆p∗i = (p
∗
i,post−p∗i )/p∗i = 23.4%
after the merger, while the other stores increase their prices by 9.1%. However, had out-
of-market competition been ignored, the price increases would have been underestimated.
For the merged stores the price increase would be estimated at ∆p̃∗i = (p̃
∗
i,post− p̃∗i )/p̃∗i =
20.0%, while for the other stores the price increase would be estimated at 6.1%. We
are interest in by how much the market-by-market approach underestimates the price





So, for connections between markets that take the form of a circle and for w = 0.1, Ui =
16.9% for stores that merge, while for the other stores in the market Ui = 49.4%. These
underestimates are fairly substantial. Moreover, the network structure and parameters
that have been chosen are conservative. In practice, even just looking at the geographical
dimension, heterogeneity is two dimensional. Out-of-market competition is likely to come
from the north, south, east and west. The two-dimensional torus network structure
captures this better (Panel B of Figure 1). Each market is then constrained by four
other markets. We thus repeat the same exercise but assuming the network structure
connecting markets is a two-dimensional torus.
The second adjustment we make is to increase the intensity of out-of-market competi-
tion. So far we have assumed that rms in neighbouring markets compete for a mass of
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customers one tenth the mass of customers two rms in the same market compete for.
Closer to alignment with the way markets were dened by the Competition Commission
in their investigation, and in particular which stores were excluded, we now let the mass
of consumers that the two stores within a market compete over be ve times larger than
the mass of consumers stores in neighboring markets compete over, instead of ten times
larger. We report our results in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1: Merging rms price increases following a facia merger
Market-by-Market Price Actual Price Underestimate
Network w Pre-merger Post-merger Pre-merger Post-merger (Ui)
Circle 0.1 1.00 1.20 1.00 1.23 16.9%
Circle 0.2 1.00 1.15 1.00 1.19 25.7%
Torus 0.1 1.00 1.15 1.00 1.19 25.7%
Torus 0.2 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.13 34.4%
Table 2: Non-merging rms price increases following a facia merger
Market-by-Market Price Actual Price Underestimate
Network w Pre-merger Post-merger Pre-merger Post-merger (Ui)
Circle 0.1 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.09 49.4%
Circle 0.2 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.07 95.0%
Torus 0.1 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.07 95.0%
Torus 0.2 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.05 181.4%
As shown in Table 1 and 2 markets are more competitive when there are more connections
between markets (torus versus the circle) and when these connections are stronger (w =
0.2 instead of w = 0.1). In these cases the price increases resulting from a merger of
facias is smaller. However, the approximation given by the market-by-market approach
also becomes worse. The relative amount by which the price increases are underestimated
gets substantially larger. When the torus network is considered with w = 0.2 the price
increase is underestimated by almost 35% for those stores merging and by over 180% for
those stores not merging.
Some intuition for why the underestimate gets worse can be obtained by considering the
Neumann series representation of prices in equation (2). This equation shows how cycles
of feedback eects increase prices. Suppose a store i in a neighboring market to store j
increases its price. Then store j will increase its price (as, in the terminology of Bulow
et al. (1985), prices are strategic complements), which incentivises store i to increase its
price further. This is true for all stores in markets neighboring the market of store i.
However, the eects do not stop there. Suppose store l is in a neighbor market to store
j but not store i. Then store l also increases its price. If store m is in a neighboring
market to store l and i, but not j, then the increase in price by store l causes store m
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to increase its price, and this further incentivises store i to increase its price. Thus all
cycles of these competitive eects matter, and this is what equation (2) is capturing.
Although individually these cycles might not have much impact, when there are many
of them, collectively they can. The impact of an individual cycle depends on w, while
the number of these cycles depends on the network structure connecting markets. Thus
the underestimate is worse for the torus than the circle network and for w = 0.2 than
w = 0.1.
In practice, there are likely to be further competitive constraints that we continue to
abstract from even with the Torus market structure. In the supermarket investigation
markets were also dened based on the size of stores, with smaller stores excluded from
the market. However, smaller stores may provide (another) weak competitive constraint,
further increasing the dimensionality of the competitive space in which we embed rms.
The indirect eects would then be stronger still.
It is important that rms do not need to be hyper-rational and able to accurately calculate
all the intricate network eects we highlight. We do need rms to be optimizing the prices
they set based on the prices set by those they directly compete for customers with (i.e.,
in our model, those in the same or adjacent markets), but that is all. If all rms are
pricing in this way, then the equilibrium outcomes we describe will obtain. In the case
of supermarkets, there is evidence that stores carefully monitor the prices being charged
by stores they compete for customers with.11
6 Robustness
Section 5 develops a model of price competition and emphasizes the importance of taking
a network approach when considering competitive forces. It shows that a local approach
to markets can lead to underestimation of a merger's eects on market prices. However,
under price competition, the strategic actions of the oligopoly rms are strategic com-
plements. When one rm prices higher, the other rms best respond to these changes by
also increasing their prices. On the other hand, if, for example, there is quantity com-
petition, the strategic actions of rms are strategic substituteswhen one rm produces
more, the other rms best respond by producing less. It is therefore important to test
whether estimates of the competitive eects of a merger that conne attention to local
eects remain biased under strategic complements, and if so, whether the direction of
the bias is the same.
With this aim, we develop a model of supermarkets competition, in which rms compete
in quantities. We show that the results are qualitatively similar to the results under price
competition.
11See paragraphs 4.66-4.68 of the Competition Commission report "The supply of groceries in the UK
market investigation."
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6.1 A simple model of quantity competition
We maintain the assumption that there are k markets, and in each market there are n
independently operated supermarkets. Supermarkets simultaneously choose a quantity
to produce. If supermarket i chooses quantity qi then γimqi is sold in market m, with
γim ∈ [0, 1] and
∑k
m=1 γim = 1, for all i. We think of γim as the magnitude of the presence
of supermarket i in market m. The (n× k) matrix Γ collects γim for each supermarket i
and market m.
Given quantity prole q, the price of the product in market m is given by the standard
linear inverse demand:



















After some manipulation, the system of equilibrium conditions is:
[I + g]q∗ = a equivalent to q∗ = [I + g]−1a,














A few observations follow. First, the network g summarises competition eects across
supermarkets. The element gij ∈ [0, 1] measures how similar supermarkets i and j are
in their presence across dierent markets. When supermarket i and supermarket j serve
distinctive subsets of markets, i.e., γimγjm = 0 for all m, we have that gij = 0. Whenever
supermarket i and supermarket j serve the same markets with the same intensity, i.e.,
γim = γjm for all m, then gij = 1.
The second observation is that, similarly to the case of price competition, we can express
equilibrium quantitites as an innite sum of indirect eects that occur in equilibrium,
i.e.,




Dierently from price competition, the indirect strategic eects oscillate between being
positive (pushing production up), and being negative (pushing production down). The
value of gij measures the direct eect on qi of supermarket j's choice and, because of
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strategic substitutes, the larger is qj the lower is qi. The value of {g2}ij measures the
(indirect) eect on qi of other supermarkets that have a connection with j. This eect
is positive. Consider the chain {gij, gjl}. As supermarket l produces more, this impacts
negatively on the quantity supermarket j chooses to produce, and this creates a positive
eect on the quantity supermarket i chooses to produce. More generally, strategic sub-
stitutes create negative eects for odd length cycles and positive eects for even length
cycles.
To compare the result with the model developed in the previous session, we consider the
same market connections: market connections organized in a circle and market connec-
tions organized in a torus as illustrated in Figure 1. Each node is a market, and so there
are 16 markets. In each market there are four supermarkets located there, and we let
each supermarket sell a proportion γ of its output in its home market. The supermarkets
also make sales in adjacent markets. In these adjacent markets they sell the remaining
quantity produced. More precisely, when the markets are connected in a circle, each
supermarket makes sales in three markets: a proportion γ to their primary market and
a proportion (1− γ)/2 to each of the two adjacent markets. When the markets are con-
nected in a torus, each supermarket makes sales in 5 markets: a proportion γ to their
primary market and a proportion (1− γ)/4 to each of the four adjacent markets.
We think of γ as being relatively large so that each supermarket sells mostly to customers
in its primary market. A large value of γ also implies that most of the competition is
within local markets. Recall that gij measures the intensity of competition between
supermarkets i and j. Note that:
• In the circle and in the torus, for each supermarket i and supermarket j whose primary
market is the same, gij = 1;
• In the circle, for each supermarket i whose primary market is m and for each super-












For example, if γ = 0.6, then gij =
0.24
0.44
≈ 0.55 for adjacent supermarkets, and if two










)2 = 0.040.44 ≈ 0.09.
• In the torus, for each supermarket i whose primary market is m and for each super-













For example, if γ = 0.6, then gij = 0.12/0.4 = 0.3 for adjacent supermarkets, and if two
markets share a neighbour in common, then gij = 0.02/0.4 = 0.05.
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For each of the networks we perform the following exercise, which mirrors the approach
we took when considering price competition. First we derive the equilibrium output
choices of supermarkets, and calculate the resulting equilibrium prices. For all markets
we then (simultaneously) merge two supermarkets located in that market, and derive
the percentage change in price in that market. Our interpretation of this exercise, as
before, is of a facia merger but with independently run stores.13 This is the price eect
of the merger the competition authority would calculate were they to take a network
approach to analyzing competition. We contrast this with the pre and post-merger
equilibrium quantities and resulting change in the price obtained under the assumption
that supermarkets operate only in their primary market. This is the merger price eect
that a competition authority would estimate under the standard within-market approach.
We set γ = 0.6. For both the circle and the torus this choice of γ is suciently high for
each market we dene to pass the SSNIP test. We also set α = b = 1 and c = 0, but our
results do not depend on this parametrisation. We have described above the pre-merger
network g for both the circle and torus. We also have ai = 1/0.44 ≈ 2.27 for the circle
and ai = 1/0.4 = 2.5 for the torus. Using the formula q
∗ = [I + g]−1a, equilibrium
outputs are about qi = 0.225 for the circle and qi = 0.227 for the torus, giving market
prices of about p = 0.10 for the circle and p = 0.09 for the torus.
After the merger of facias, there are three rms operating in each market. However, the
value of gij does not change for any two rms i and j that remain after the merger,
including the rm created as a result of the merger. This is because after the merger, we
have the same situation as before but with three identical rms in each market instead of
four. Specically, there is the same overlap in market presence for two rms in the same
location, the same overlap in market presence between rms located in adjacent markets,
and so on. Moreover, we still have ai = 1/0.44 ≈ 2.27 for the circle and ai = 1/0.4 = 2.5
for the torus. Thus the post-merger outputs are qi = 0.291 and qi = 0.294 for the circle
and torus respectively, while the post-merger prices are 0.128 and 0.118 for the circle and
torus respectively. Thus the merger results in a 29.1% price increase for the circle and a
29.4% price increase for the torus.
12Note that, because of the torus structure, if i shares a neighbor in common with j, then i must share
two neighbors in common with j.
13As we discuss at the end of this section, we expect the dierence between the network and non-
network approach to be more pronounced when there is a single merger, but consider this exercise more
useful as a pedagogical device given our earlier treatment of price competition.
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As a comparison, suppose that instead the eect of the merger was estimated assuming
that pre-merger there are four rms operating in each market, and these rms make all
their sales within the market. Then, in equilibrium, pre-merger each rm would choose
qi = 1/5 and the market price would be p = 0.2. Post-merger each rm would choose
qi = 1/4 and the market price would be p = 0.25. Thus prices would be expected to
increase by 25% post-merger instead of between 29.1% and 29.4%. This means that the
estimated impact on prices is between 80% and 85% of the actual price increase.
These dierences are far from trivial, but less striking than we found under price com-
petition. This is because under price competition, all eects are reinforcing, while under
quantity competition the eects go in dierent directions. In this case, considering a
facia merger rather than an individual store merger, worked against the overall network
eects. This is because the direct eects of mergers in adjacent markets have a counter-
vailing impact. Indeed, had we considered a store merger instead of a facia merger, all
cycles in both the torus and cycle networks would have been of even length, and thus all
eects would have been reinforcing. While this is in part due to the specic structure
of circle and torus networks, cycles of even length will in general be more common than
cycles of odd length. The rst-order non-local eects of a store merger occur in adjacent
markets, and incentivise the stores located here to increase their outputs, and this further
reinforces the incentives of the rm created by the store merger to restrict its output.
An interesting implication of our analysis is that there should be systematic miss-estimation
of merger eects when there are many weak out-of-market constraints that interact with
each other. In principle, this is something that might be tested for. While there is some
limited academic work on the ex-post analysis of merger decisions (and also some work
in this regard undertaken on behalf of regulators), this work is typically done on a case-
study basis (e.g., Aguzzoni et al. (2016)). Unfortunately, there is no work we are aware
of that compares ex-ante predictions about the competitive eects of many mergers with
the outcomes of those mergers (when they are permitted).
7 Conclusions: other networked markets
The supermarkets investigation provides one instance in which markets are networked and
a systemic approach might have been appropriate. There are many others. In the case
of supermarkets the network naturally arose from the geographical locations of dierent
stores and the preferences of consumers. In other investigations the network structure
will arise for dierent reasons. Other types of horizontal dierentiation and vertical
dierentiation can generate networks in which certain rms compete weakly with each
other for consumers, and not all rms compete directly with one another. For example, in
investigations that consider public transportation (see the Competition Commission 2011
Local Bus Services Market Investigation) a key question is the extent to which dierent
modes of transportation provide a competitive constraint. When do train and bus routes
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compete? How about driving, walking or cycling? The same issues regarding market
denition and taking a market-by-market approach instead of a systemic approach arise
here too. In the case of heathcare provision, publicly subsidised services and privately
nanced treatments have been considered separate markets but may provide additional
competitive constraints that interact with the geographical locations of hospitals and
other healthcare facilities (see the CMA 2014 Market investigation into Private healthcare
markets, and the investigation into the proposed merger between Royal Bournemouth
and Christchurch Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and Poole Hospital NHS Foundation
Trust).
We are witnessing a proliferation of platforms in the digital economy, from classical search
engines and online-marketplaces to platforms associated with the sharing economy. Some
of these platforms have expanded to a level that antitrust competition authorities around
the world are considering or conducting investigations into possible abuses of dominant
positions.14 Platform mediated networks connect multiple sides of markets, each side
with, possibly dierent objectives. Those on one side of the market typically care about
access to those on other sides. When markets are intermediated by multiple platforms in
this way, networks can be used to represent who has access to whom. In such settings, a
change in regulation that aects the service that the platforms oer to a particular side
will also impact on the other sides. Even though there is a well developed literature on
two-sided markets,15 this is another area in which we believe network theory could be
used by antitrust authorities to inform their assessments.
We have emphasized the value a systemic network-based approach can have for incorpo-
rating and aggregating eects that would otherwise be out-of-market. However, within
dened markets there can also be constraints on competition between the rms that
a networks approach can capture. For example, switching costs can create customers
that are locked-in to purchasing from a given rm within a market, limiting competition
among rms in such markets (Klemperer, 1987). The presence of switching costs thereby
generates a particular networked structure. Each rm will have some locked-in consumers
they have monopoly power over, and some other consumers they compete for. These can
be important in several markets. For example, in the market for banking services, it
might be the case that the largest banks do not exert the strongest competitive pres-
sures if they also have a larger proportion of locked in customers (see, for example, the
2001 Competition Commission report on the proposed merger between Lloyds-TSB and
Abbey National, which was blocked). In markets for advice (lawyers, accountants, etc),
conicts of interest can prevent all rms from competing for all consumers. In others, not
all consumers may be aware of all products. Often consumers do not have access to all
retailers and, in this case, exclusive dealing contracts might prevent all consumers from
having access to all products (Ramezzana, 2019). More generally, when eort is required
14The European commission has already taken actions with respect to abusive practice in online
advertising by Google. Similar concerns and discussions are now salient in USA.
15Two of the early and seminal contributions to this literature are Rochet and Tirole (2003) and
Armstrong (2006).
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to sustain eective supply relationships between producers and retailers, such networks
can also emerge (e.g., Kranton and Minehart (2001), Elliott (2015)).
While the importance of these intricacies of competition between dierent products is
starting to be recognised (Armstrong, 2018), networks provide a useful way to visualize
these interactions,16 and a set of tools that have been developed in dierent contexts that
can be readily applied.
A Maths supporting claims in Section 5.3
In this section we solve a more general problem that supports the analysis and claims in



































































































Dene ĝ such that ĝij =
gij
di
, where di =
∑











16Technically, any analysis that is possible with a networks approach is also possible without it. A
network can be mathematically represented by an adjacency matrix, and properties of networks have
analogous properties in this matrix. However, it is much easier to see a path or cycle on a graph than it
is by staring at an adjacency matrix, and it is often such things that are important for the economics.
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Then, as long as [I − 1
2
ĝ] is invertible, the unique Nash equilibrium prices are given by
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